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Re: [rtcweb] Security Architecture: IdP for RTP and RTCP

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Fri, 11 July 2014 17:56 UTC

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Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2014 10:56:44 -0700
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
To: Justin Uberti <juberti@google.com>
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Subject: Re: [rtcweb] Security Architecture: IdP for RTP and RTCP
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On 11 July 2014 09:03, Justin Uberti <juberti@google.com> wrote:
> Different m= lines can have different fingerprints, but do we expect to
> support multiple fingerprints with the same digest algorithm on the same m=
> line, where the receiver then checks that the received certificate matches
> one of the possible fingerprints?

That's what the spec says to do.  That's how Firefox currently
operates.  It's not particularly hard to do.

To be precise, it assembles all relevant a=fingerprint attributes for
the m= section and allows the session to proceed if all sections have
one match, using the provided hash function.  I think that we provide
SHA-256, but support the full intersection of the textual names
registry and what is implemented and enabled (i.e., sha1 is OK).

I don't think that we require that the hash function match the
function used in the certificate signature; that's a nonsensical
requirement.

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