Re: [saag] Possible backdoor in RFC 5114

Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> Wed, 22 March 2017 18:20 UTC

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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 11:20:02 -0700
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To: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
Cc: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>, saag@ietf.org, Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
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Subject: Re: [saag] Possible backdoor in RFC 5114
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On Mar 22, 2017 8:15 AM, "Ben Laurie" <benl@google.com> wrote:



On 7 October 2016 at 16:56, Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

>
> > On 7 Oct 2016, at 16:59, Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> wrote:
> >
> > Stephen Farrell writes:
> >>
> >> So I'm not seeing anyone so far argue to not
> >> deprecate these somehow.
> >>
> >> We could just make 5114 historic as Yoav suggests,
> >> or, if someone writes an I-D to explain why, we
> >> could obsolete 5114. (Such an I-D would presumably
> >> also say something about codepoints that point at
> >> 5114 from other registries.)
> >>
> >> Assuming nobody shows up saying these are in
> >> fact in widespread use I'd be supportive of us
> >> getting rid of cruft.
> >
> > I think the NIST ECP groups are quite widely supportd, and used.
> > RFC5114 includes both Nist ECP Groups (192, 224, 256, 384 and 521) and
> > 3 MODP groups.
> >
> > In IPsec, ECP groups are widely used, those MODP groups with subgroup
> > are not. On the other hand I think only those 192, 256 and 521 bit
> > groups are really used, and those are defined also in RFC5903 (which
> > obsoleted original 4753 which had serious bug in it).
>
>
> First, I think you meant 256, 384 and 521 bit, not the 192.
>
> Second, 5114 did not fix the bug in 4753. It just referenced 4753 for
> formatting. You know this better than I do, but I don’t think the IANA
> registry ever referenced 5114 for these ECP groups.
>
> So for the three useful groups in 5114 you didn’t need it (as 4753)
> already existed, and you don’t need it now, as 5903 exists. I don’t see
> anything standing in the way of moving to historic or obsoleting it.
>

Possibly I missed something here: why should we be any happier about 5903
than we are about 5114?


Can you prepare a backdoored elliptic curve that passes all acceptence
critera?

The reason not to use 5114 is that one can construct moduli with hidden
SNFS structure.



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