Re: [saag] Possible backdoor in RFC 5114

Antonio Sanso <asanso@adobe.com> Wed, 12 October 2016 07:17 UTC

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From: Antonio Sanso <asanso@adobe.com>
To: "saag@ietf.org" <saag@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [saag] Possible backdoor in RFC 5114
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Date: Wed, 12 Oct 2016 07:17:18 +0000
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Subject: Re: [saag] Possible backdoor in RFC 5114
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hi Yoav

>IANA numbers have been assigned to them for IKE, but they have not seen widespread use

I would not be too sure about this. For example see [0]. On top Exim and BouncyCastle have RFC 5114 as default for DH. 
And more to comeā€¦

regards

antonio

[0] http://blog.intothesymmetry.com/2016/01/openssl-key-recovery-attack-on-dh-small.html