Re: [secdir] secdir Review of draft-ietf-v6ops-3gpp-eps

[Ronald Bonica <[e-mail]>]

I think that it would be a good idea to spin a new version before the call next week.

                                            Ron


> -----Original Message-----
> From: [e-mail] [mailto:[e-mail]] On Behalf Of
> Stephen Farrell
> Sent: Tuesday, August 30, 2011 9:22 AM
> To: jouni korhonen
> Cc: Russ Mundy; [e-mail];
> [e-mail]; [e-mail]
> Subject: Re: secdir Review of draft-ietf-v6ops-3gpp-eps
> 
> 
> I think its worth including. Why don't you talk to Ron and
> see if he'd prefer you to push out a version now or not and
> we can go from there.
> 
> Cheers,
> S.
> 
> On 08/30/2011 02:07 PM, jouni korhonen wrote:
> >
> > Stephen,
> >
> > Thanks for picking up the nits. And yes, I would push out a new
> version with the additional security consideration text below, *if*
> folks think it is worth having it there.
> >
> > And for prohibiting the use of IMSI/MSISDN (or any "3GPP identity")
> as the IID, the reference would be Section 5.3.1.2.2 of [TS.23401].
> >
> > - Jouni
> >
> >
> > On Aug 30, 2011, at 2:52 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> Hi Jouni,
> >>
> >> Just checking - do you intend to push out a new version with this
> >> included before the telechat next week?
> >>
> >> A few nits below as well.
> >>
> >> Ta,
> >> Stephen.
> >>
> >> On 08/25/2011 11:50 AM, jouni korhonen wrote:
> >>> Russ,
> >>>
> >>> Thanks for the review. You are echoing the same thing as the most
> in IESG. I crafted a bit of text that could be put into the security
> considerations section. I don't know if this would be enough.
> >>>
> >>> - JOuni
> >>>
> >>> ----
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>     In 3GPP access the UE and the network always perform a mutual
> >>>     authentication during the network attachment
> [TS.33102][TS.33401].
> >>>     Furthermore, each time a PDP Context/PDN Connection gets
> created,
> >>>     a new connection, a modification of an existing connection and
> >>>     an assignment of an IPv6 prefix or an IP address can be
> authorized
> >>>     against the PCC infrastructure [TS.23203] and/or PDN's AAA
> server.
> >>>
> >>>     The wireless part of the 3GPP link between the UE and the
> (e)NodeB
> >>>     as well as the signaling messages between the UE and the
> MME/SGSN
> >>>     can be protected depending on the regional regulation an
> operator
> >>>     deployment policy. User plane traffic can be confidentially
> >>
> >> s/confidentially/confidentiality/ would be better.
> >>
> >> If you can add references as to how that can be achieved that
> >> would also be good.
> >>
> >> The same points apply for the control plane I guess.
> >>
> >>>     protected. The control plane is always at least integrity and
> >>>     replay protected, and may also be confidentially protected. The
> >>>     protection within the transmission part of the network depends
> >>>     on the operator deployment policy.
> >>>
> >>>     Due the nature of 3GPP point-to-point link model, the UE and
> the
> >>>     first hop router (PGW/GGSN or SGW) are the only nodes on the
> link,
> >>>     which mitigates most of the known on-link attacks. For off-link
> IPv6
> >>>     attacks the 3GPP EPS is as vulnerable as any IPv6 system. There
> has
> >>
> >> s/has/have/
> >>
> >>>     also been concerns that UE IP stack might use permanent
> subscriber
> >>
> >> s/UE IP stack/the UE IP stack/
> >>
> >>>     identities, such as IMSI and MSISDN, as the source for IPv6
> address
> >>>     Interface Identifier. This would be a privacy threat and allow
> >>>     tracking of subscribers, and therefore use of IMSI and MSISDN
> as the
> >>>     Interface Identifier is prohibited. However, there is no
> standardized
> >>>     method to block such misbehaving UEs.
> >>
> >> Prohibited by whom? Maybe add a reference?
> >>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>     [TS.33102]
> >>>                3GPP, "3G Security;  Security architecture",
> >>>                3GPP TS 33.102 10.0.0, December 2010.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>     [TS.33401]
> >>>                3GPP, "3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE);
> >>>                Security architecture", 3GPP TS 33.401 10.1.1,
> >>>                June 2011.
> >>>
> >>> On Aug 25, 2011, at 12:43 AM, Russ Mundy wrote:
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>> I have reviewed this document as part of the security
> directorate's ongoing
> >>>> effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.
> These
> >>>> comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security
> area
> >>>> directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these
> comments just
> >>>> like any other last call comments.
> >>>>
> >>>> While I do agree with the factual correctness of the Security
> Considerations
> >>>> section (the document does not _introduce_ any security related
> concerns),
> >>>> the support for IPv6 in 3GPP networks described in document
> certainly does
> >>>> have a number of security concerns.  Some obvious examples, use of
> DHCP
> >>>> based address management and access control/authorization of the
> PDN
> >>>> Connection (shown in Figure 8).  Although these and other security
> issues
> >>>> are likely addressed in various other documents, it would be
> useful to make
> >>>> a definitive statement to that effect in the Security
> Considerations
> >>>> section.  It would be even more useful if some more specific
> references were
> >>>> to be included in parts of the document that clearly deal with
> security
> >>>> issues such as address management and access control and
> authorization.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>         Russ Mundy
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >
> >