Re: [secdir] secdir Review of draft-ietf-v6ops-3gpp-eps

[jouni korhonen <[e-mail]>]

I have just uploaded -05 with updated security considerations section.

- Jouni


On Aug 30, 2011, at 4:43 PM, Ronald Bonica wrote:

> I think that it would be a good idea to spin a new version before the call next week.
> 
>                                            Ron
> 
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: [e-mail] [mailto:[e-mail]] On Behalf Of
>> Stephen Farrell
>> Sent: Tuesday, August 30, 2011 9:22 AM
>> To: jouni korhonen
>> Cc: Russ Mundy; [e-mail];
>> [e-mail]; [e-mail]
>> Subject: Re: secdir Review of draft-ietf-v6ops-3gpp-eps
>> 
>> 
>> I think its worth including. Why don't you talk to Ron and
>> see if he'd prefer you to push out a version now or not and
>> we can go from there.
>> 
>> Cheers,
>> S.
>> 
>> On 08/30/2011 02:07 PM, jouni korhonen wrote:
>>> 
>>> Stephen,
>>> 
>>> Thanks for picking up the nits. And yes, I would push out a new
>> version with the additional security consideration text below, *if*
>> folks think it is worth having it there.
>>> 
>>> And for prohibiting the use of IMSI/MSISDN (or any "3GPP identity")
>> as the IID, the reference would be Section 5.3.1.2.2 of [TS.23401].
>>> 
>>> - Jouni
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Aug 30, 2011, at 2:52 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Hi Jouni,
>>>> 
>>>> Just checking - do you intend to push out a new version with this
>>>> included before the telechat next week?
>>>> 
>>>> A few nits below as well.
>>>> 
>>>> Ta,
>>>> Stephen.
>>>> 
>>>> On 08/25/2011 11:50 AM, jouni korhonen wrote:
>>>>> Russ,
>>>>> 
>>>>> Thanks for the review. You are echoing the same thing as the most
>> in IESG. I crafted a bit of text that could be put into the security
>> considerations section. I don't know if this would be enough.
>>>>> 
>>>>> - JOuni
>>>>> 
>>>>> ----
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>    In 3GPP access the UE and the network always perform a mutual
>>>>>    authentication during the network attachment
>> [TS.33102][TS.33401].
>>>>>    Furthermore, each time a PDP Context/PDN Connection gets
>> created,
>>>>>    a new connection, a modification of an existing connection and
>>>>>    an assignment of an IPv6 prefix or an IP address can be
>> authorized
>>>>>    against the PCC infrastructure [TS.23203] and/or PDN's AAA
>> server.
>>>>> 
>>>>>    The wireless part of the 3GPP link between the UE and the
>> (e)NodeB
>>>>>    as well as the signaling messages between the UE and the
>> MME/SGSN
>>>>>    can be protected depending on the regional regulation an
>> operator
>>>>>    deployment policy. User plane traffic can be confidentially
>>>> 
>>>> s/confidentially/confidentiality/ would be better.
>>>> 
>>>> If you can add references as to how that can be achieved that
>>>> would also be good.
>>>> 
>>>> The same points apply for the control plane I guess.
>>>> 
>>>>>    protected. The control plane is always at least integrity and
>>>>>    replay protected, and may also be confidentially protected. The
>>>>>    protection within the transmission part of the network depends
>>>>>    on the operator deployment policy.
>>>>> 
>>>>>    Due the nature of 3GPP point-to-point link model, the UE and
>> the
>>>>>    first hop router (PGW/GGSN or SGW) are the only nodes on the
>> link,
>>>>>    which mitigates most of the known on-link attacks. For off-link
>> IPv6
>>>>>    attacks the 3GPP EPS is as vulnerable as any IPv6 system. There
>> has
>>>> 
>>>> s/has/have/
>>>> 
>>>>>    also been concerns that UE IP stack might use permanent
>> subscriber
>>>> 
>>>> s/UE IP stack/the UE IP stack/
>>>> 
>>>>>    identities, such as IMSI and MSISDN, as the source for IPv6
>> address
>>>>>    Interface Identifier. This would be a privacy threat and allow
>>>>>    tracking of subscribers, and therefore use of IMSI and MSISDN
>> as the
>>>>>    Interface Identifier is prohibited. However, there is no
>> standardized
>>>>>    method to block such misbehaving UEs.
>>>> 
>>>> Prohibited by whom? Maybe add a reference?
>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>    [TS.33102]
>>>>>               3GPP, "3G Security;  Security architecture",
>>>>>               3GPP TS 33.102 10.0.0, December 2010.
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>    [TS.33401]
>>>>>               3GPP, "3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE);
>>>>>               Security architecture", 3GPP TS 33.401 10.1.1,
>>>>>               June 2011.
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Aug 25, 2011, at 12:43 AM, Russ Mundy wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I have reviewed this document as part of the security
>> directorate's ongoing
>>>>>> effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.
>> These
>>>>>> comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security
>> area
>>>>>> directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these
>> comments just
>>>>>> like any other last call comments.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> While I do agree with the factual correctness of the Security
>> Considerations
>>>>>> section (the document does not _introduce_ any security related
>> concerns),
>>>>>> the support for IPv6 in 3GPP networks described in document
>> certainly does
>>>>>> have a number of security concerns.  Some obvious examples, use of
>> DHCP
>>>>>> based address management and access control/authorization of the
>> PDN
>>>>>> Connection (shown in Figure 8).  Although these and other security
>> issues
>>>>>> are likely addressed in various other documents, it would be
>> useful to make
>>>>>> a definitive statement to that effect in the Security
>> Considerations
>>>>>> section.  It would be even more useful if some more specific
>> references were
>>>>>> to be included in parts of the document that clearly deal with
>> security
>>>>>> issues such as address management and access control and
>> authorization.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>        Russ Mundy
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>> 
>>>