Re: [secdir] [Anima] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-16

Michael Richardson <> Wed, 03 October 2018 14:28 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <>
To: Brian E Carpenter <>
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Date: Wed, 03 Oct 2018 10:28:12 -0400
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Subject: Re: [secdir] [Anima] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-16
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Brian E Carpenter <> wrote:
    >> 2) you use NETCONF's mechanism with vouchers that you obtain another
    >> way, and you place them on USB key/CDROM/QR-code.

    > You could. But that makes me a bit nervous too. It's not far from
    > seeing a yellow sticky in the ops room saying "sys pw muggle3scop#" or
    > whatever. People who want airgap security are very cautious about USB
    > keys these days.

I agree, it's a bit similar.
Except that the voucher is a signed entity, and disclosing it causes privacy
issues (people know what you have), rather than being p0wned.  It can easily
go on a CDROM or something else you do trust.
A QR code is also possible, assuming your personnel-safety-critical device
has a camera.
[oh. Now I'm thinking about 2001, Space Odyssey.  I'm seeing Dave Borman with
a giant QR code tattoed on him, much like we proposed doing with the RSA
algorithm back during the cryptowars of the 1990s ]
{and the issues with USB devices are squarely a problem of GUIs accepting
input devices without validation.  It's fixable}

    >> 3) you continue to configure such a network with craft-serial console,
    >> initiating the EST connection via some other credential.

    > It still doesn't scale.

And, worse, I think, it's prone to human error, which is exactly what we want
personnel-safety-critical devices not to suffer from.

    >> > I believe this can be fixed by clearer scoping of the document, and
    >> by > renaming the "lower security" section as "alternative trust
    >> models" or > something.
    >> I accept that the document could have better text here.  At one point
    >> we discussed an operational considerations document.  Is that really
    >> what you are asking for?

    > Later, maybe, but to get this draft out of the door I think we can do a
    > simpler fix. As Christian pointed out, there isn't really a distinct
    > security analysis, so I think we need to say: This <text> is the
    > recommencded trust model, based on an on-line MASA. If you don't like
    > that trust model, here are the alternatives: <text>.

It's gonna take a gallon or two of caffeinated beverage.

]               Never tell me the odds!                 | ipv6 mesh networks [
]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works        | network architect  [
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