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Re: [sidr] adoption call for draft-kent-sidr-adverse-actions-02

Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> Tue, 29 March 2016 21:55 UTC

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Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2016 18:55:06 -0300
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: Tim Bruijnzeels <tim@ripe.net>
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Cc: sidr <sidr@ietf.org>, Sandra Murphy <sandy@tislabs.com>
Subject: Re: [sidr] adoption call for draft-kent-sidr-adverse-actions-02
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> I do have one remaining concern, but I hope that this can be
> addressed: this document can be perceived as proof of 'all the things
> wrong / scary' about RPKI used for origin validation and/or
> BGPSec. However, to my knowledge, there is no similar analysis of
> adverse actions to IRRs. Most of the same problems exist there - and
> far worse: RPs do not have the benefit of object security so they
> would be largely unaware. I think it would be counterproductive if
> this wasn't clear, and the document is abused to make a point for
> being better of with simple IRR.

this has bothered me.  thank you for expressing it far better than i
could

randy

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