Re: [sidr] adoption call for draft-kent-sidr-adverse-actions-02

Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Wed, 30 March 2016 14:52 UTC

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From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Date: Wed, 30 Mar 2016 10:27:00 -0400
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Subject: Re: [sidr] adoption call for draft-kent-sidr-adverse-actions-02
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Tim,

That's a fair point. Are you suggesting that we create a separate doc to 
enumerate
vulnerabilities in the IRR context, or that we add a section to this doc 
to describe,
in less detail, such vulnerabilities?

Steve
> Dear working group,
>
> I support adopting this work. I believe it's useful to think about what can go wrong. I am happy to see that this document (1) focusses on adverse actions irrespective of intentional or accidental cause, and (2) does not suggest a solution.
>
> I do have one remaining concern, but I hope that this can be addressed: this document can be perceived as proof of 'all the things wrong / scary' about RPKI used for origin validation and/or BGPSec. However, to my knowledge, there is no similar analysis of adverse actions to IRRs. Most of the same problems exist there - and far worse: RPs do not have the benefit of object security so they would be largely unaware. I think it would be counterproductive if this wasn't clear, and the document is abused to make a point for being better of with simple IRR.
>
> Regards
> Tim