Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security
Danny McPherson <danny@tcb.net> Tue, 22 November 2011 11:00 UTC
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From: Danny McPherson <danny@tcb.net>
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Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2011 06:00:02 -0500
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To: Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security
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On Nov 22, 2011, at 1:09 AM, Christopher Morrow wrote: >> Probably they are the closest it gets, but a line from the ENISA paper sticks with me: >> >> "Unfortunately, the quality of the IRRs varies, which makes it difficult to rely on them" Terry: I think this is in large part attributed to lack of formally verifiable IRR objects (i.e,. objects bootstrapped by some resource certification mechanism). There are many other reasons as well, I'm working with a few folks to try and capture some of these.. > For instance, ALT-DB blows as a source for as701 data... RADB has some > for AS701... > Neither has RPSL-Policy-Foo for AS701 :( ('accepts all routes from > <list-o-customer-asns> && sends-all-routes to > <everyone-except-SFP-peers>') > > I got the impression that the culture in ripe-region essentially was > that: "Everyone autogens filters from RIPE-IRR, so ... get that right > or your internet is very small." I like that culture, it provides accountability and puts the onus on each operator to maintain their information. -danny
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Christopher Morrow
- [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Danny McPherson
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Jakob Heitz
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Russ White
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Jakob Heitz
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Jakob Heitz
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Randy Bush
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Russ White
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Robert Raszuk
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Shane Amante
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Terry Manderson
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Terry Manderson
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Danny McPherson
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Russ White
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security Brian Dickson