Re: [Sidrops] [WGLC] draft-ietf-sidrops-roa-considerations-01 - Ends 10/March/2022

[Stephen Kent <[e-mail]>]

Geoff,
>
> agreed, yet we have TLS using just-in-time credential provisioning in the
> initial handshake which has very different scaling properties. The models
> of DNSSEC provisioning also staple the credentials to the data. RPKI
> is one of the few models that attempt to pre-provision the entirety of the
> credential sets to all relying parties all of the time, and I find myself
> wondering why we ever thought that such an approach would scale!
>
> yes, I agree its just one more aspect of the intrinsic brokenness of the
> Internet, and, as you say, we plod on! :-)

TLS creates a pairwise connection between two entities, so transmitting 
the cert of the server is an obvious, simple approach to solve the 
problem in question. And, because of the artificially shallow PKI 
underlying the issuance of certs to servers (thanks to the browser 
vendors and the cabal of for-profit CAs), it's easy to ensure that a 
client gets the certs (and CRLs) it needs.

The RPKI requires essentially ALL RPs to have access to the certs for 
essentially ALL address space holders. It is much more logical to have a 
bulk distribution mechanism to facilitate this, vs. some sort of 
pairwise distribution mechanism of the sorts you cite. The requirements 
for cert and CRL distribution are completely different for the RPKI vs. 
the Web PKI- apples vs. kumquats (as Randy might say).

Steve