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Re: [Sip] draft-state-sip-relay-attack-00

Raphael Coeffic <rco@iptel.org> Mon, 09 March 2009 11:41 UTC

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Date: Mon, 09 Mar 2009 12:41:33 +0100
From: Raphael Coeffic <rco@iptel.org>
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To: Hadriel Kaplan <HKaplan@acmepacket.com>
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Cc: Nils Ohlmeier <lists@ohlmeier.org>, "sip@ietf.org" <sip@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Sip] draft-state-sip-relay-attack-00
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Hadriel Kaplan wrote:
>   
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: sip-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:sip-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
>> Hadriel Kaplan
>> Sent: Saturday, March 07, 2009 7:31 PM
>>
>> But anyway, I'm not sure what you mean by the question.  How is what going
>> to work?  Stopping INVITE-based authentication relay-attacks?  You don't
>> need an SBC-type box to stop that.  Just disconnect the cable.  :)
>> Or, use the counter-measures in the draft.  Or change the protocol, or at
>> least the authentication mechanism.
>>     
>
> BTW, you don't need to be an SBC to have such policies.  There is nothing in RFC 3261 which prohibits a pure Proxy from restricting who it accepts INVITEs from, and when.  There are even some clever tricks one can do to make it a stateless mechanism.
>
>   
That's a good point. Requiring the user to be registered and only 
accepting requests from the registered contacts provide a fair-enough 
level of security concerning the attack debated. But I am still hoping 
that we could find a solution not requiring this kind of measures, which 
I would call "user-restricting".

-Raphael.

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