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Re: [Sip] draft-state-sip-relay-attack-00

Hadriel Kaplan <HKaplan@acmepacket.com> Sun, 08 March 2009 04:24 UTC

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From: Hadriel Kaplan <HKaplan@acmepacket.com>
To: Hadriel Kaplan <HKaplan@acmepacket.com>, Nils Ohlmeier <lists@ohlmeier.org>
Date: Sat, 07 Mar 2009 23:25:20 -0500
Thread-Topic: [Sip] draft-state-sip-relay-attack-00
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Subject: Re: [Sip] draft-state-sip-relay-attack-00
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: sip-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:sip-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Hadriel Kaplan
> Sent: Saturday, March 07, 2009 7:31 PM
>
> But anyway, I'm not sure what you mean by the question.  How is what going
> to work?  Stopping INVITE-based authentication relay-attacks?  You don't
> need an SBC-type box to stop that.  Just disconnect the cable.  :)
> Or, use the counter-measures in the draft.  Or change the protocol, or at
> least the authentication mechanism.

BTW, you don't need to be an SBC to have such policies.  There is nothing in RFC 3261 which prohibits a pure Proxy from restricting who it accepts INVITEs from, and when.  There are even some clever tricks one can do to make it a stateless mechanism.

-hadriel

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