Re: [Sip] draft-state-sip-relay-attack-00

Nils Ohlmeier <lists@ohlmeier.org> Sat, 07 March 2009 22:40 UTC

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Date: Sat, 07 Mar 2009 23:40:50 +0100
From: Nils Ohlmeier <lists@ohlmeier.org>
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To: Hadriel Kaplan <HKaplan@acmepacket.com>
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Cc: "sip@ietf.org" <sip@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Sip] draft-state-sip-relay-attack-00
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Am 07.03.2009 20:18 Uhr, schrieb Hadriel Kaplan:
>> So a requirement to make the attack possible is that the user agent
>> responds
>> to challenges generated for in-dialog requests.
>
> Right, and that the attacked domain accepts INVITEs from its AoR's with non-registered Contacts; or accepts INVITEs from its static AoR's to come in from unknown locations.  That's pretty rare in my world, but ymmv.

Luckily it seems we are not living in the same world :-)
I call it a feature that I can make authenticated calls without being 
registered.

[...]

>>> - I never unterstood why a proxy should pass through the authentication
>>> request from a foreign domain.
>> Because this is how it is specified in section 22.3 of RFC3261.
>
> And it would have to continue to do so.  There are actual use-cases for this.

Could you please share one of these use-cases with me.

> I think there's even a reasonable use-case for challenging in-dialog requests: connected-identity, for example.
>
> But you don't even need to challenge in-dialog requests for this form of attack: if the victim calls you, then you can challenge the initial INVITE.

Sorry, but how is this going to work in world without a SBC which knows 
my credentials?
Remember my proxy can not answer the challenge (CSeq mis-match). And the 
caller hopefully does not know my credentials, otherwise the whole 
attack would be pointless.

Cheers
   Nils