Re: [Sip] draft-state-sip-relay-attack-00

Jonathan Rosenberg <jdrosen@cisco.com> Mon, 16 March 2009 20:45 UTC

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Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2009 16:46:04 -0400
From: Jonathan Rosenberg <jdrosen@cisco.com>
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To: Raphael Coeffic <rco@iptel.org>
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Cc: sip@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Sip] draft-state-sip-relay-attack-00
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Raphael Coeffic wrote:

>> As such, I dont think this attack is likely in practice. However, in 
>> theory it is possible. The essence of the attack is that the victim is 
>> providing credentials to an unauthenticated server (since the attacker 
>> is acting like a server, asking for credentials). In that way, as 
>> others have pointed out, it is similar to baiting attacks that have 
>> been previously documented. With SIP it is most easily remedied by a 
>> rule which says, 'don't pass credentials for domain X to a server that 
>> is not domain X'.
> Which means that you exclude any relays in between. I think it also 
> implies reverse DNS lookups, right?

No - no reverse DNS.
And I am excluding cases where, you are connected (meaning, the domain 
you registered to) to one domain and making a call through that domain 
reach another domain which requires your credentials. I think that is 
very unlikely.

> 
>> Server identity can be verified by normal server-only auth between a 
>> client and its server, but even that is not needed. 
> Right, mutual authentication seems to be the best way.
> 
>> A client will know which domain its proxy is representing, and once 
>> connected, it only provides credentials for that domain.
>>
> What do you mean by "connected"? And why should a UA only provide 
> credentials for one domain only?

I'm saying, when a phone registers or makes a call, it does so by 
connecting to a SIP server, through a domain name or IP config or 
whatever. THat server will have an associated credential. For any 
request sent to that server, it should never provide a credential except 
the one associated with it.

Your attack is possible only when the client sends credentials for a 
domain, different than the one it is currently registered or placed the 
call through in the first place.

-Jonathan R.

-- 
Jonathan D. Rosenberg, Ph.D.                   111 Wood Avenue South
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