Re: [tcpm] Review of draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-auth-opt-01

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Hi, Eric,

Eric Rescorla wrote:
...(concerns about having a separate key mgt doc)

These concerns can be taken to the ADs, but at this point they may be
moot. We might consider merging the resulting docs, but it's not clear
why that would be useful.

|> | The protocol must be constructed so that it is not possible to
substitute
|> | one packet for another and have it be accepted. This means that
(either)
|> | the data fed into the authentication function must be distinct or the
|> | authentication function must have a distinct key.
|>
|> That implies a per-packet nonce, i.e., some fields - either in the
|> packet or external - that are unique on a per-packet basis.
|
| Well, perhaps we're just differing in terminology, but I don't call
| per-packet data fed into the authentication function a nonce.
| I think of the nonce as a discrete value, not just the data.
| But in this case we're just talking about MACing the packet.
|
| I just checked and neither AH nor TLS uses the term nonce here.

IPsec uses sequence numbers for multiple reasons, so they're not called
just nonces. I'm not sure if the same is true for TLS. If we're at least
talking about the same thing (which I think we are now), then we can
find a better word to describe it...

Joe
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org

iEYEARECAAYFAkiPmdwACgkQE5f5cImnZrs0pACfTPAEByS/3DxoQGxYzttfWubt
I64AoM+6MdHC8jUQKM2MMufdx+kBVCWI
=cWF5
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
_______________________________________________
tcpm mailing list
tcpm@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tcpm