Re: [therightkey] Other solutions to the problem

[Phillip Hallam-Baker <[e-mail]>]

Zero net admin steps is probably a necessary criteria. What you think not
hard might as well be rocket science to most.


On Thu, Nov 1, 2012 at 5:10 AM, Ben Laurie <[e-mail]> wrote:

> On 31 October 2012 23:57, Rick Andrews <[e-mail]> wrote:
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Ben Laurie [mailto:[e-mail]]
> >> Sent: Monday, October 29, 2012 3:10 AM
> >> To: Rick Andrews
> >> Cc: Rob Stradling; [e-mail]; Paul Hoffman
> >> Subject: Re: [therightkey] Other solutions to the problem
> >>
> >> On 26 October 2012 22:31, Rick Andrews <[e-mail]>
> >> wrote:
> >> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> >> From: Ben Laurie [mailto:[e-mail]]
> >> >> Sent: Friday, October 26, 2012 1:51 AM
> >> >> To: Rob Stradling
> >> >> Cc: Rick Andrews; [e-mail]; Paul Hoffman
> >> >> Subject: Re: [therightkey] Other solutions to the problem
> >> >>
> >> >> On 26 October 2012 09:24, Rob Stradling <[e-mail]>
> >> >> wrote:
> >> >> > On 26/10/12 00:58, Rick Andrews wrote:
> >> >> > <snip>
> >> >> >
> >> >> >> AFAICT, for CT to really work it will require participation from
> >> >> every CA
> >> >> >> whose roots are in browsers. I think you're underestimating how
> >> hard
> >> >> it will
> >> >> >> be to achieve that.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> > Rick,
> >> >> >
> >> >> > Ultimately, assuming the RFC5878 TLS extension gains widespread
> >> >> support in
> >> >> > server and client software, CT won't _require_ participation from
> >> any
> >> >> CA.
> >> >> > Each certificate holder will be able to configure their server to
> >> >> send their
> >> >> > certificate's CT proof to each client.
> >> >
> >> > I see, so the certificate holder can submit their newly-minted
> >> certificate to a log server to get a CT proof. Instead of requiring the
> >> participation of every CA, you now require the participation of every
> >> certificate holder.
> >>
> >> No, it is an option.
> >
> > I understand that. I was trying to point out that for CT to be
> effective, you either need all CAs to participate, or for every CA that
> doesn't participate, their customers who want protection have to
> participate directly. I feel that's a pretty high bar to surmount.
>
> Its only software. The process of participating in CT for a server
> operator is:
>
> 1. Run command line tool once, giving it your certificate as input and
> an SCT file as output.
>
> 2. Add one line of configuration to your server config.
>
> Not exactly rocket science. If people _really_ find it hard, we could
> build it into the servers so there was no manual step at all.
>
> >> >You might say that not every certificate holder will need or want CT,
> >> but I would guess that the number that would want the protection would
> >> be far greater than the number of CAs.
> >>
> >> Given that the plan is browsers will refuse non-CTed certs, I imagine
> >> most holder of certificates used by the public will want CT.
> >
> > Do you have agreements with the major browser vendors to do this? It's
> possible that not all of them will be on board.
>
> In practice, only one major browser needs to participate to give herd
> immunity. Obviously it would be nice if they all did, but it is not an
> urgent problem.
>
> >> >> > But with participation from the CAs, it should be possible to
> >> realize
> >> >> the CT
> >> >> > dream far sooner.  And (even in a future world where RFC5878 is
> >> >> supported
> >> >> > everywhere) if the CA takes care of CT proof distribution, then
> >> that
> >> >> makes
> >> >> > life easier for the certificate holder.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >> Further, no one has yet brought up the privacy issue. CAs sell a
> >> lot
> >> >> of
> >> >> >> certificates to companies for their internal use. Some of them
> >> may
> >> >> object to
> >> >> >> publishing all their internal domain names.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> > This has been a concern for Comodo too, so I spoke to AGL about it
> >> a
> >> >> few
> >> >> > weeks ago.  AIUI, the plan is that CT clients will have a user-
> >> >> configurable
> >> >> > whitelist (empty by default) of domain names for which CT proofs
> >> will
> >> >> not be
> >> >> > required.  Participating CAs should allow customers to opt-out
> >> from
> >> >> having
> >> >> > their certs automatically logged with CT.
> >> >
> >> > I believe in your plan each browser will be a CT client. Aside from
> >> the fact that the white list is an attractive target for hackers, I
> >> don't see how the average user is going to know how to configure this
> >> white list. I'm reminded of Adam's arguments against Convergence
> >> (http://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/09/07/convergence.html).
> >>
> >> This is why I think the best solution is to issue private certs
> >> through a name constrained intermediate which is logged.
> >
> > I agree.
>
> I'm glad we agree on something!
> _______________________________________________
> therightkey mailing list
> [e-mail]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey
>



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/