Re: [therightkey] Barely-capable CAs

Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> Thu, 01 November 2012 20:06 UTC

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Date: Thu, 01 Nov 2012 20:06:28 +0000
From: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
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To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
References: <7500672F-5BDE-4EBE-ABC3-1AFEF2972D95@vpnc.org> <508A48C5.9070005@comodo.com> <544B0DD62A64C1448B2DA253C0114146069D76E5FC@TUS1XCHEVSPIN33.SYMC.SYMANTEC.COM> <CABrd9STHtw__Wm30Z5T27mx8PMb-mScCSa-EZVDdeQvy_Rru1Q@mail.gmail.com> <544B0DD62A64C1448B2DA253C0114146069F66F830@TUS1XCHEVSPIN33.SYMC.SYMANTEC.COM> <CABrd9SSJWm_8BY9uN4D6=LmogwkNeLMZtJaOX2MQU1QuCHJwyg@mail.gmail.com> <80A8F0DC-C894-4299-AEC7-12B84A803E84@vpnc.org> <CAMm+Lwh2Qhv8eHtmy=KisShdJiLYe=ziyfezQELqqfu8y9H5qg@mail.gmail.com> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1211010935330.60568@hiroshima.bogus.com> <CAMm+LwjQiJ3aWpAYdy1hxtf09Sf=4g9AO=r-PihSPVkc8PMLkg@mail.gmail.com> <5092B8C4.3070607@cs.tcd.ie> <CABrd9SRKuo-VW6AHapz0NogKSGmcXXtRomTh1bvZudaB5q-GTQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAMm+LwhxLYhEJ213AmvTo6cCfPRq_0X1hxJx1vN13nfxkBWLiw@mail.gmail.com> <CABrd9ST3=4b73jDZb=Cxq6L_+2z7ExCKcY-ywBiD5hW98uAWBw@mail.gmail.com> <CAMm+Lwh3KeAXibf+vE9KW+JJ7XaUSDMkstcTp-LDwCQe7QX8Mg@mail.gmail.com>
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Cc: Lucy Lynch <llynch@civil-tongue.net>, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, "therightkey@ietf.org" <therightkey@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [therightkey] Barely-capable CAs
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On 01/11/12 20:01, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> OK so some examples do exist. But really what proportion of real world
> compromises do not involve something bone headed like using a 512 bit
> key for DKIM signatures?
>
> What I am saying here is not 'don't do CT', I am saying that we have to
> make the ease of administration a high priority in the design.

I would say that "ease of administration" for server operators is one of 
the main reasons why Ben is interested in getting CAs to participate!  ;-)

> On Thu, Nov 1, 2012 at 3:52 PM, Ben Laurie <benl@google.com
> <mailto:benl@google.com>> wrote:
>
>     On 1 November 2012 18:38, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com
>     <mailto:hallam@gmail.com>> wrote:
>      > Again, does it appear so subtle after it has been discovered?
>
>     Well, I find I have to remind myself how it works. So ... yeah.
>
>     Also, I assumed Bliechanbacher was the exponent 3 thing, which was
>     also pretty subtle.
>
>      >
>      > Would the flaw have been discovered sooner if there was not so
>     much dead
>      > code?
>
>     I don't think dead code had any influence on either of these.
>
>      >
>      >
>      > On Thu, Nov 1, 2012 at 2:35 PM, Ben Laurie <benl@google.com
>     <mailto:benl@google.com>> wrote:
>      >>
>      >> On 1 November 2012 18:00, Stephen Farrell
>     <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie <mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>>
>      >> wrote:
>      >> >
>      >> >
>      >> > On 11/01/2012 05:22 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>      >> >> Having worked in Web security over 20 years now, I have still
>     to see a
>      >> >> case
>      >> >> where a system was breached because of a really subtle design
>     flaw.
>      >> >
>      >> > Bleichenbacher?
>      >>
>      >> TLS renegotiation?
>      >>
>      >> >
>      >> > S.
>      >> > _______________________________________________
>      >> > therightkey mailing list
>      >> > therightkey@ietf.org <mailto:therightkey@ietf.org>
>      >> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey
>      >
>      >
>      >
>      >
>      > --
>      > Website: http://hallambaker.com/
>      >
>
>
>
>
> --
> Website: http://hallambaker.com/
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
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-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online
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