Re: [TLS] Deprecating SSLv3

Nico Williams <> Mon, 24 November 2014 21:31 UTC

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Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 15:30:54 -0600
From: Nico Williams <>
To: Watson Ladd <>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Deprecating SSLv3
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On Mon, Nov 24, 2014 at 12:57:01PM -0800, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Nov 24, 2014 10:30 AM, "Martin Rex" <> wrote:
>              [...]? Even if you noticed the attack, and it isn't from the
> government,  what deterrence is there? [...]

And/or what mitigation...

Bearer tokens are currently, and for the forseeable future, a fact of
life.  An annoying fact of life, maybe, but one that we must accept.

Surely that can't be controversial.

TLS 1.3 simply must be resistant to adaptive chosen plaintext attacks
intended for recovery of frequently repeated secrets (bearer tokens).

To be fair to Martin R., I suspect he's not objecting to this, so much
as to the use of bearer tokens in the first place, much as I'm objecting
to blaming TLS's past failures on the Internet threat model while... not
being against updating the Internet threat model.  That we can't fix the
bearer token problem from where we stand doesn't mean that Martin can't
complain about it...