Re: [TLS] Update spec to match current practices for certificate chain order

Geoff Keating <geoffk@geoffk.org> Fri, 08 May 2015 20:18 UTC

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From: Geoff Keating <geoffk@geoffk.org>
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Date: Fri, 8 May 2015 13:18:05 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Update spec to match current practices for certificate chain order
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> On 8 May 2015, at 8:51 am, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:

> Geoffrey Keating wrote:
>> 
>> This explicitly allows the sender to send multiple certificates for
>> itself, which would simplify a bunch of problems; SNI is no longer
>> necessary (but still desirable), and it's no longer necessary to
>> negotiate the certificate signing algorithms.
> 
> Huh???
> 
> This doesn't compute.  There is just one digitally-signed object
> (or static RSA key exchange in TLS up to v1.2), so there is no
> "choice" among multiple server certificates.

There can be multiple certificates with the same public key, but different subject identification.