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Re: [TLS] Update spec to match current practices for certificate chain order

Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Thu, 07 May 2015 14:20 UTC

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Update spec to match current practices for certificate chain order
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Date: Thu, 07 May 2015 14:20:16 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Update spec to match current practices for certificate chain order
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Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> writes:
>Peter Gutmann wrote:
>> For example my code looks for a cert containing the site name
>> ("www.whatever.com") and then builds a chain up via the parent links until it
>> can't find any more useful certs.  That just works no matter what the other
>> side sends.
>
>Adding workarounds for clearly bogus behaviour is a very bad strategy,
>because it makes the situation worse for everyone in the long run.

In my case (and possibly others) it's not a workaround since the same code
that does PKCS #7/CMS also does TLS cert chains, in order to handle the more
open-ended PKCS #7 requirements it automatically deals with oddball TLS
chains.

Peter.

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