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Re: [TLS] An SCSV to stop TLS fallback.

Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> Sat, 07 December 2013 06:32 UTC

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Date: Fri, 06 Dec 2013 22:32:52 -0800
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: mrex@sap.com
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Cc: IETF TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] An SCSV to stop TLS fallback.
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To clarify.
>
> Btw. AES128-CBC-SHA1 is more secure than AES128-GCM/-CCM, so the only
> thing the client might be "loosing" is a little performance, and
> that AEAD can not currently be negotiated and used unless
> ClientHello.client_version is set to { 0x03, 0x03 } is a silly defect
> of the specification(s) that could be easily fixed.
I am assuming you are discussing the modes as specified and
implemented in TLS? In that case you are dead wrong.
Lucky 13, BEAST, and even if we drop all that no protocol depending
both on SHA1 and AES can be stronger than one depending
on AES alone.
Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

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