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Re: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-belyavskiy-fakesni-00.txt

Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Wed, 20 February 2019 03:44 UTC

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com>, TLS Mailing List <tls@ietf.org>, "secdispatch@ietf.org" <secdispatch@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-belyavskiy-fakesni-00.txt
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Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 03:43:56 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-belyavskiy-fakesni-00.txt
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Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com> writes:

>The draft describes a Fake SNI mechanism intended to cheat DPI systems in a
>case when a DPI system blocks the connection if ESNI is present.

Since this mechanism advertises the fact that a fake SNI is present, wouldn't
the DPI then also block the connection for that?

Peter.

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