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Re: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-belyavskiy-fakesni-00.txt

Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Wed, 20 February 2019 23:51 UTC

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-belyavskiy-fakesni-00.txt
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Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 23:51:34 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-belyavskiy-fakesni-00.txt
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Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net> writes:

>Would it be possible to engineer a hidden channel in the TLS 1.3 Hello? I bet
>that's quite doable. I am sure that fields like "opaque Random[32]" or "opaque
>legacy_session_id<0..32>" could be used creatively, and there are other fields
>in common extensions that could also be of service.

I'd thought about that too, thus my comment about subliminal signalling, the
problem is that if you've got a standardised subliminal message than it's not
really a subliminal message any more.

Peter.

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