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Re: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-belyavskiy-fakesni-00.txt

Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Wed, 20 February 2019 07:21 UTC

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com>
CC: TLS Mailing List <tls@ietf.org>, "secdispatch@ietf.org" <secdispatch@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-belyavskiy-fakesni-00.txt
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Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 07:21:20 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-belyavskiy-fakesni-00.txt
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​Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com> writes:

>Fake SNI is delivered out-of-band for the handshake

But then won't the DPI check the out-of-band source as well?  If you've got a
MITM sitting there then they can do the same lookups and whatnot that the
client does, unless you're relying on the client being off-path, which seems a
bit of a leap.  You'd need to implement it via some sort of subliminal
signalling mechanism that the DPI can't detect.

Peter.

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