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Re: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-belyavskiy-fakesni-00.txt

Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com> Wed, 20 February 2019 07:35 UTC

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From: Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 10:35:34 +0300
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To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Cc: TLS Mailing List <tls@ietf.org>, "secdispatch@ietf.org" <secdispatch@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-belyavskiy-fakesni-00.txt
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On Wed, Feb 20, 2019 at 10:21 AM Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
wrote:

> Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com> writes:
>
> >Fake SNI is delivered out-of-band for the handshake
>
> But then won't the DPI check the out-of-band source as well?  If you've
> got a
> MITM sitting there then they can do the same lookups and whatnot that the
> client does, unless you're relying on the client being off-path, which
> seems a
> bit of a leap.  You'd need to implement it via some sort of subliminal
> signalling mechanism that the DPI can't detect.
>
>
In fact if DPI begins to poll domains whether FakeSNI record is present,
we have a race between changing the value in FakeSNI and DPI polling.
And DoH/DoT ensures that DPI has to poll.


-- 
SY, Dmitry Belyavsky

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