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Re: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-belyavskiy-fakesni-00.txt

Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com> Wed, 20 February 2019 11:06 UTC

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From: Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 14:06:20 +0300
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To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-belyavskiy-fakesni-00.txt
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On Wed, Feb 20, 2019 at 10:35 AM Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Feb 20, 2019 at 10:21 AM Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
> wrote:
>
>> Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com> writes:
>>
>> >Fake SNI is delivered out-of-band for the handshake
>>
>> But then won't the DPI check the out-of-band source as well?  If you've
>> got a
>> MITM sitting there then they can do the same lookups and whatnot that the
>> client does, unless you're relying on the client being off-path, which
>> seems a
>> bit of a leap.  You'd need to implement it via some sort of subliminal
>> signalling mechanism that the DPI can't detect.
>>
>>
> In fact if DPI begins to poll domains whether FakeSNI record is present,
> we have a race between changing the value in FakeSNI and DPI polling.
> And DoH/DoT ensures that DPI has to poll.
>
>
Let me clarify. I understand that the solution I propose is not perfect.
But there is no silver bullet, and this is just another way to make a life
of DPI harder.

-- 
SY, Dmitry Belyavsky

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