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Re: [TLS] A closer look at ROBOT, BB Attacks, timing attacks in general, and what we can do in TLS

Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net> Fri, 15 December 2017 01:05 UTC

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From: Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net>
Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2017 17:05:37 -0800
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To: Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] A closer look at ROBOT, BB Attacks, timing attacks in general, and what we can do in TLS
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On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 5:01 PM, Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de> wrote:

> On Thu, 14 Dec 2017 16:45:57 -0800
> Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net> wrote:
>
> > But what would that look like? What would we do now, in advance, to
> > make it easy to turn off AES? For example.
>
> I think this is the wrong way to look at it.
>
> From what I'm aware nobody is really concerned about the security of
> AES. I don't think that there's any need to prepare for turning off AES.
>

Well, DJB is a notable concerned critic of AES and its safety in some
respects ... but I was using AES as kind of a worst-case scenario since so
many things do depend on it and it's especially hard to leave. I'm not
aware of some ground-breaking cryptanalysis :) But I do think the question
is worth having an answer for. I think we *do* need to prepare for turning
off AES, there's always a chance we might have to.

-- 
Colm

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