Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

[Tony Arcieri <[e-mail]>]

I was one of the people arguing my hardest against the BITS Security
proposal to continue to (ab)use RSA static keys to allow passive MitM, even
though TLS 1.3 had already moved forward on what I would call a more modern
protocol design of the sort I believe payments companies should embrace to
improve their security.

That said, if people do want to MitM themselves, I would rather there be a
single, easily detectable and very explicit way of doing so, as opposed to
sketchy, incompatible, ad hoc mechanisms. Furthermore, it would be nice to
have a clear answer for these users, less they continue to make (bad)
arguments that there is something fundamentally wrong with the design of
TLS 1.3 that makes it incompatible with "industry requirements".

Clearly there are echoes of the scary protocols of yesteryear, i.e.
Clipper/LEAP. I think if you visit Matt Green's Twitter page and check the
image header you will discover he is quite familiar with these things, and
my personal presumption would be he is not displaying this image to show
his undying love of the Clipper chip, although perhaps he's an especially
crafty and duplicitous NSA sleeper agent.