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Re: [TLS] TLSrenego - possibilities, suggestion for SSLv3

Marsh Ray <marsh@extendedsubset.com> Wed, 11 November 2009 19:49 UTC

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Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2009 13:49:30 -0600
From: Marsh Ray <marsh@extendedsubset.com>
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References: <4AFA36A8.9010805@extendedsubset.com> from "Marsh Ray" at Nov 10, 9 09:59:36 pm, <200911111916.nABJGtVm015003@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp> <CE2A65CAAFE55048BA6682475F9A7DBF5EA6E601BC@ACLMAIL01.corp.audiocodes.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLSrenego - possibilities, suggestion for SSLv3
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Yair Elharrar wrote:
> Martin Rex wrote:
> 
> It would probably be better if the entire 32-bit gmt_unix_time was
> set to one of two predefined magic values:

Do you know that nothing cares about the actual time encoded?

Why burn 32 bits of entropy to represent one bit?

> one indicating an initial
> connection ('INIT'), the other indicating a renegotiation ('RNEG'). A
> client receiving 'RNEG' on an initial handshake would know the
> session is under attack. A client receiving 'INIT' on an initial
> handshake would know the session is safe. Any other value would
> indicate the server is running an insecure implementation.

The problem still exists between sessions (2,3) (3,4) and so on.

- Marsh

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