Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequests

Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> Sun, 02 February 2020 03:05 UTC

Return-Path: <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 93663120024 for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 1 Feb 2020 19:05:08 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.997
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.997 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id y2C1M8J4XJFn for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 1 Feb 2020 19:05:06 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-lj1-x22c.google.com (mail-lj1-x22c.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::22c]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6EA23120020 for <tls@ietf.org>; Sat, 1 Feb 2020 19:05:06 -0800 (PST)
Received: by mail-lj1-x22c.google.com with SMTP id q8so11123469ljb.2 for <tls@ietf.org>; Sat, 01 Feb 2020 19:05:06 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=5nTxdFgJ/8w0L+4vFvrcsLabebjGqYvwIHt1D457pSc=; b=mFQeH3/Mf1wG6LgYOd3bTvhtv+hDe9wAhMiWDwHZu8XH1i9D9O+sMmhjIQc4HG2PCq R1kEeBY8UcJnCF6WIky3vayDJybS6BmWz/adez5+EXuRVhc5c1rT+9In5K7pueyy5iYv CGjQrx2kYaARIoV/wtjOq1hmJrbndWaBXwe3Jni+BpmJNMxdBGOv+Rw34+06eWh5HyIn 16whdKIxCQzgGsguaI9RlbYTTpJDhwJBTBL/UTEAAzfVH7wLyYSeuWGa3yvz/EUpgBw5 2ZvCl+ZSF/D3ilIWkbTtYkURdXbwf7e5O/8qmje5VtmLNzeA4amhVGwJOO8lGWORXLD1 oZuA==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to; bh=5nTxdFgJ/8w0L+4vFvrcsLabebjGqYvwIHt1D457pSc=; b=IQbb/D5YGOVilpTTfmOlVC6//wfDssEDn8v7cYjmIVn/27MWz36OSTPLz5dWhZ/KX1 jYqZgIER6/VNx35vF34Q+cF/N2FvLT6zRUVWF8iq8Hdn/0iroCvDjw1TWI0rEU1k0jJq bwuPAxksQIhYFfoZp6RXnx/aNawOzlCh9gcQeeN8NIAk/nn+VMxbzYmEdzw+mhoSOIHB erup1HpUZLYvk/t8W5cnY6Sh3OmeHiD2dmUiPOuazAIqHjYnBvecuibxXEZa2EFwS/Bj dmpRVdtThBNaJP7Ctr3pWj3rPREeqCj8hokXIDzmOlm88QyUmwmIs8Bplu3QUVXdrh00 59rQ==
X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAXFYRPSQz65q+zG580R6RU8UDfpecQfoAodCjCIPQ3BhudRf4ZQ zzMDVwdopHZOo4no66iuhR6t8OPtSxBHrjRzDLjAuc8JfJo=
X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqwSWpvSN9rxUkzuxhb2kxsHkdwrW/prjFN87VV7aCgJXiUYpddwU3W8jo0PfBvwPzpz6AXrsZrlU4vELXXTWdE=
X-Received: by 2002:a2e:9b90:: with SMTP id z16mr9236841lji.254.1580612704460; Sat, 01 Feb 2020 19:05:04 -0800 (PST)
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <9e4ada20-680e-6fa7-f8bb-e94c26440d82@cs.tcd.ie> <9A5EE7C8-360D-49C0-92F8-274FE1A94249@apple.com> <20200202013016.GH49778@straasha.imrryr.org>
In-Reply-To: <20200202013016.GH49778@straasha.imrryr.org>
From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 01 Feb 2020 19:04:53 -0800
Message-ID: <CACsn0cnaUZHqo8L_qjvqE2bt-JU28QqG7S8m4xMwdK5CXyDHzw@mail.gmail.com>
To: TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000c6e11f059d8f1237"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/vFdq3V1ba567WDNXXg3y4uZYLgk>
Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequests
X-BeenThere: tls@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls/>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 02 Feb 2020 03:05:08 -0000

On Sat, Feb 1, 2020 at 5:30 PM Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
wrote:

> On Sat, Feb 01, 2020 at 07:53:57AM -0800, Tommy Pauly wrote:
>
> > Instead, it seems unclear what value the special use of 0 and 255 adds
> > that wouldn’t be better served by a separate extension.
>
> The benefit of the new value of "0" is *unambiguous* signalling that the
> client would like to reuse the ticket if possible, and the new "255"
> then carries the "We don't need no stinking tickets" signal.
>

Brown sticker conventions belong in the Bermuda Bowl, not TLS. I'd be
happier with a magic 0, or a N = valid tickets at the end including the one
used, then swapping 2 values and making one magic.
(For those of you who aren't bridge fiends:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brown_sticker)

Sincerely,
Watson