Re: [tsvwg] L4S operational guidance draft
Pete Heist <pete@heistp.net> Tue, 17 November 2020 20:04 UTC
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From: Pete Heist <pete@heistp.net>
To: "Holland, Jake" <jholland=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, Wesley Eddy <wes@mti-systems.com>
Cc: "tsvwg@ietf.org" <tsvwg@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2020 21:04:42 +0100
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Subject: Re: [tsvwg] L4S operational guidance draft
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Hi Jake/Wesley, just one add below... On Tue, 2020-11-17 at 16:07 +0000, Holland, Jake wrote: > Hi tsvwg, > > Thanks Greg for writing this doc. I think it's a good step > forward and headed in the right direction. > > My main interest at this stage is making sure that L4S won't > break the rollout for regular/classic ECN. > > To that end, in light of the support I saw from several in > the WG for moving the L4S experiment forward, what I'd like > to see landed before docs start going to last call is a > normative requirement on L4S senders to avoid sending L4S > traffic with ECT(1) set unless they have good evidence that > there are not classic marking bottlenecks on-path. > > I think this doc makes a good start at describing the > justification for that requirement and listing the kinds of > systems and deployment models that can meet that bar of > "good evidence". > > And I think it's a good choice to write it up in a separate > doc like this, so that it can be separately updated to > document other kinds of reasonable evidence, or evolving > observations that would have an impact on these > considerations. > > So my most significant bit of feedback is +1 for this doc, I > think it moves the discussion in the right direction in a > helpful way. > > A couple of refinements I'd like to see, to give a general > sense of how I'd like to see this doc evolve from its > promising start: > > - I'm not sure FQ classic ECN should get quite as big a pass > here as this doc gives it. The fact that L4S builds a > standing queue to a classic marking bottleneck's threshold > is a problem in itself, but also there is some likelihood > of hash collisions when there are multiple flows, and those > are problematic for the colliding competing flows the same > as you get with a shared queue, even though the smaller > scope of collision limits the damage. > I'd be ok with outlining these problems, noting they're > less severe than the shared queue problem, and allowing for > more flexibility than the harder requirement that's needed > for avoiding shared marking queues (like being more > permissive with how recent or compelling the evidence > should be, since the harm is more constrained). But I don't > think classic marking FQ queues should be treated as a non- > problem. One addition to this is the fact that when tunneled traffic traverses fq_codel, since the 5-tuple for all of the tunnel's inner flows is the same, that places them in one fq_codel queue, leading to the same safety problem when L4S and non-L4S flows meet. So, while single queue RFC3168 AQMs or hash collisions are one way for that to happen, tunneled traffic may be a more likely way. We recently added a test scenario using Wireguard through fq_codel to cover that case, which for some reason I didn't think to try earlier: https://github.com/heistp/l4s-tests/#unsafety-in-tunnels-through-rfc3168-bottlenecks That should probably be covered in the guidance in relation to FQ classic ECN as well... > - I'd like to see either references to good representative > samples of the published tests that demonstrate the described > unfairness issues, or failing that some somewhat stronger > wording that doesn't just abstractly mention 'unfairness' and > sum up the scope of the issue as "could be a cause of > concern". > > Something like "The L4S response to CE is not compatible with > classic ECN marking." seems to me a more appropriate summary > description of this issue. But I think just giving a good > several references that quantitatively demonstrate the scale > of the problem seems better than quibbling over exactly how > to describe it. > > > - I also have a slight concern over this doc being > informational. > > I'm not sure whether informational docs are ever updated, but > I don't think I've ever seen it done, and it seems to be a > possible necessity over the next years to update guidance from > this doc as we see how the L4S experiment unfolds, or as the > research recommended in this doc moves forward and perhaps > solves the classic queue detection problem, or as we learn more > about the deployment of classic ECN (whether it takes off or > peters out or continues its incremental growth). > > Is it possible and reasonable to incorporate this as a > normative part of the experiment and make it experimental, > instead of just informational? > > > As the doc gets closer to complete, hopefully I'll be able to > come back to it and give a full review at some point, but I think > these points capture my initial high level reaction to the -01 > version of the draft. > > Regardless, I would say WG adoption of this doc sounds useful to > me, and that this is on the right track for providing the > resolution we've discussed to my outstanding concerns with the L4S > experiment wrt its interactions with classic queues. > > - Jake > > > On 11/16/20, 10:31 AM, "Wesley Eddy" <wes@mti-systems.com> wrote: > > In today's meeting, it was mentioned that the L4S operational > guidance > draft is part of the "safety case" for advancing other L4S drafts. > It's > not as mature as the other docs yet (e.g. there are several"TODO" > portions), but we want to understand if people think it's going in > the > right direction and will be suitable for this purpose as it's > sketched, > or what else should be added/changed/etc. > > This is on the agenda for Wednesday's meeting. > > So, if you have bandwidth, please check out the L4S operational > guidance > draft prior to the Wednesday meeting, so that we can get a better > sense > of how to proceed: > > > https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-white-tsvwg-l4sops/__;!!GjvTz_vk!Axw2CdE9R-Px4wskXijeNFQOgQA6FLFUIyrRhvM67g7NWS1bs6Fc23ELKOixjuw$ > > > >
- [tsvwg] L4S operational guidance draft Wesley Eddy
- Re: [tsvwg] L4S operational guidance draft Sebastian Moeller
- Re: [tsvwg] L4S operational guidance draft Jonathan Morton
- Re: [tsvwg] L4S operational guidance draft Ruediger.Geib
- Re: [tsvwg] L4S operational guidance draft Holland, Jake
- Re: [tsvwg] L4S operational guidance draft Pete Heist
- Re: [tsvwg] L4S operational guidance draft Holland, Jake
- Re: [tsvwg] L4S operational guidance draft Ingemar Johansson S
- Re: [tsvwg] L4S operational guidance draft Jonathan Morton
- Re: [tsvwg] L4S operational guidance draft Sebastian Moeller
- Re: [tsvwg] L4S operational guidance draft Holland, Jake
- Re: [tsvwg] L4S operational guidance draft Ingemar Johansson S
- Re: [tsvwg] L4S operational guidance draft Sebastian Moeller