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Re: [Uta] SMTP Over TLS on Port 26 - Implicit TLS Proposal

Alice Wonder <alice@domblogger.net> Tue, 08 January 2019 04:01 UTC

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From: Alice Wonder <alice@domblogger.net>
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Date: Mon, 07 Jan 2019 20:01:49 -0800
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Subject: Re: [Uta] SMTP Over TLS on Port 26 - Implicit TLS Proposal
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On 1/7/19 6:55 PM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Alice Wonder <alice@domblogger.net> writes:
> 
>> I'm a privacy zealot
> 
> So how would deprecating opportunistic TLS help in that regard?
> 
> Peter.
> 

MX servers would not be violating RFC if they rejected plain text 
connection attempts (over 90% of which these days are spam).

MX servers would be violating RFC if they did accept plain text connections.

This will virtually eliminate passive attacks that log non-encrypted 
traffic. The TLS 1.3+ requirement makes it less worthwhile to log 
encrypted traffic because the secrets used for the ciphers are ephemeral.

btw in the 00s I knew a tech at a large silicon valley data center who 
bragged that he logged SMTP traffic and had scripts to look for 
potential insider trading information. Whether he actually did or not I 
do not know, but it is very possible he did.

There are good reasons to encrypt as much as possible.

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