Re: [websec] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-03.txt

"Ryan Sleevi" <ryan-ietfhasmat@sleevi.com> Wed, 17 October 2012 18:33 UTC

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Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2012 11:33:34 -0700
From: "Ryan Sleevi" <ryan-ietfhasmat@sleevi.com>
To: "Carl Wallace" <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
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Cc: IETF WebSec WG <websec@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [websec] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-03.txt
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On Wed, October 17, 2012 11:07 am, Carl Wallace wrote:
<snip>
>  I don't doubt any of this, but still think a crawler tool would be
>  sufficient in many (if not most) cases.  It'd probably be instructive to
>  run for the site operators in the worst case.  Note, I did not suggest
>  that a user report feature was not a good or necessary thing, only that a
>  builder tool for the site operator to run without bothering any users
>  would be nice to have in the toolbox too.  Thinking about it, they may
>  well be the same tool if the user reporting tool is aggressive enough.

Ah, I misunderstood your point to be suggesting that a crawler would be
sufficient, and reporting would be unnecessary.

I'm a big fan of the crawler - both for purposes of pinning and for
purposes of generally understanding the nature of the web PKI. Public
datasets such as the EFF SSL Observatory data [1], along with private
datasets such as those that inform tools such as Qualys' SSL Labs [2] or
the Google's Certificate Catalog [3], would go a good deal to establish
what the known-possible certificate hierarchies are. I just thing there
will be a tail of oddities and legacy that are only picked up by
reporting.

[1] https://www.eff.org/observatory
[2] https://www.ssllabs.com/
[3]
http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2011/04/improving-ssl-certificate-security.html