Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning
Joseph Bonneau <jbonneau@gmail.com> Tue, 26 August 2014 22:45 UTC
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From: Joseph Bonneau <jbonneau@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Aug 2014 18:44:46 -0400
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To: Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com>
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Cc: "draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning@tools.ietf.org" <draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning@tools.ietf.org>, Eric Lawrence <ericlaw1979@hotmail.com>, Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>, IETF WebSec WG <websec@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning
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On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 6:10 PM, Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com> wrote: > On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 2:42 PM, Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg> wrote: > > This is especially true if includeSubdomains is enabled. It'd be > > common for that directive to apply to hosts that the -RO header would > > not be included on. In PKP-RO, it would not be applied to them; in PKP > > it would. > > OK, so, what do you want? > > Is it even possible for me to write text you would accept? The answer may be "no" here which would suggest dropping PKP-RO completely as an alternative way forward. Taking a step back, this thread features two sides arguing that this feature is (largely) useless for what the other side wants it for (testing vs. security). As pointed out, the current version is not nearly sufficient for testing a site's PKP-readiness due to subdomains and (potentially) load-balancing a domain onto servers with different keys (some of which may not be in the pin set and not set PKP-RO and be missed by setting the header on other servers). Testing with -RO is surely better than no testing at all, but it seems most domains would need to do more extensive testing manually by crawling/viewing network traffic/etc. at which point they'd gain the benefit of -RO testing anyways. Maybe there is some benefit for quick tests to see what certs UAs are actually receiving, which it was pointed out Facebook used Flash to achieve (I know of at least two other academic research efforts that have used the same approach). But if this is the goal, PKP-RO is pretty limited compared to adding something to JS or WebCrypto which would just ping back with the exact cert chain received. This use case seems best addressed elsewhere rather than bolted onto this spec. Hence, given the concern that this spec is already bloated, I would advocate we seriously consider dropping -RO mode completely.
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Ryan Sleevi
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Eric Lawrence
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Tom Ritter
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Chris Palmer
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Tom Ritter
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Chris Palmer
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Chris Palmer
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Tom Ritter
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Eric Lawrence
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Ryan Sleevi
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Chris Palmer
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Trevor Perrin
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Tom Ritter
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Chris Palmer
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Joseph Bonneau
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Tom Ritter
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Joseph Bonneau
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Trevor Perrin
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Ryan Sleevi
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Yoav Nir
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Tom Ritter
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Eric Lawrence
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Ryan Sleevi
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Yoav Nir
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Joseph Bonneau
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Eric Lawrence
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Trevor Perrin
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Trevor Perrin
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Trevor Perrin
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Ryan Sleevi
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Ryan Sleevi
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Tobias Gondrom
- Re: [websec] draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning Yoav Nir