Re: [6tisch] [6tisch-security] proposed security text for architecture draft

[Michael Richardson <[e-mail]>]

<[e-mail]> wrote:
    > Use of EAP-TLS and terminating TLS session at AAA server does not mean
    > that all parameters have to be coming from AAA server.  Especially when
    > PANA is used, PAA can be co-located with JCE and provide 6top data over
    > a secure PANA SA.  Actually this model applies to any EAP method.

So, we would be creating a masterkey with EAP-TLS, and then we would use PANA
as a transport for CoAP?

I understand why we want to use EAP when we have devices with humans at the
far end; 
1) it means the pieces in the middle do not need to know anything about the
   kind of authentication will be done

2) we can deploy new forms of authentication (such as challenge response
   methods, and things like EAP-SIM or EAP-AKA) without changes to the middle
   machines.

3) we can proxy things all the way back to the users home service, which is 
   how GSM roaming works these days.

I'm unaware that industrial/deterministic uses of 15.4 have requirements for
ths kind of thing.  I seem to recall a conversation about whether or not
including a SIM card into nodes would work from a power, size, and cost point
of view.  Having a replaceable SIM card would definitely be a really easy way
to imprint new devices.  If someone can do that, then we really don't need
any of this... 

-- 
Michael Richardson <[e-mail]>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-