Re: [Cfrg] AES-SIV versus AES-GCM for Encrypted Key Data
Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Tue, 17 May 2016 14:51 UTC
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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Tue, 17 May 2016 10:51:23 -0400
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] AES-SIV versus AES-GCM for Encrypted Key Data
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Stephen: > On 17/05/16 14:50, Russ Housley wrote: >> I do not speak for NSA. However, NSA only uses algorithms and modes >> that are FIPS-approved. AES-SIV does not meet that requirement. If >> that happens in the future, then the direction might change. > > I don't speak for anyone:-) > > I strongly believe that holding off from making improvements > of the basis of FIPS approval/certification is a really bad > idea. If a case can be made that the suggested change is less > good or no better than the FIPS approved/certified thing, > then that is a debate worth having, but waving the FIPS flag > is not itself IMO a good counter argument to a claim that > some change is an improvement. Your comments are beyond the context of the question at the front of this thread. This thread was about a particular set of IEEE 802.11 ballot comments: https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/16/11-16-0596-01-00ai-more-counters.docx > And I'd be disappointed if an international organisation of > any kind did accept that kind of flag waving. I guess that you are disappointed. I understand that AES-SIV was selected over AES-GCM. Russ
- [Cfrg] AES-SIV versus AES-GCM for Encrypted Key D… Paul Lambert
- Re: [Cfrg] AES-SIV versus AES-GCM for Encrypted K… Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [Cfrg] AES-SIV versus AES-GCM for Encrypted K… Russ Housley
- Re: [Cfrg] AES-SIV versus AES-GCM for Encrypted K… Paul Lambert
- Re: [Cfrg] AES-SIV versus AES-GCM for Encrypted K… Yoav Nir
- Re: [Cfrg] AES-SIV versus AES-GCM for Encrypted K… Paul Lambert
- Re: [Cfrg] AES-SIV versus AES-GCM for Encrypted K… Dan Harkins
- Re: [Cfrg] AES-SIV versus AES-GCM for Encrypted K… Russ Housley
- Re: [Cfrg] AES-SIV versus AES-GCM for Encrypted K… Russ Housley
- Re: [Cfrg] AES-SIV versus AES-GCM for Encrypted K… Russ Housley
- Re: [Cfrg] AES-SIV versus AES-GCM for Encrypted K… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Cfrg] AES-SIV versus AES-GCM for Encrypted K… Russ Housley
- Re: [Cfrg] AES-SIV versus AES-GCM for Encrypted K… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Cfrg] AES-SIV versus AES-GCM for Encrypted K… Russ Housley
- Re: [Cfrg] AES-SIV versus AES-GCM for Encrypted K… Stephen Farrell