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Re: [Cfrg] AES-SIV versus AES-GCM for Encrypted Key Data

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Mon, 16 May 2016 20:56 UTC

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Mon, 16 May 2016 16:56:14 -0400
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To: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] AES-SIV versus AES-GCM for Encrypted Key Data
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On May 16, 2016, at 3:35 PM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:

> I would think that nonce/counter misuse protection would be an advantage for this type of application.  

I do not see how.  There is a fresh key-encryption key for each wrap.  Where can the counter be reused.

Russ

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