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Re: [Cfrg] AES-SIV versus AES-GCM for Encrypted Key Data

Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> Mon, 16 May 2016 21:27 UTC

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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <D35F843A.93C91%paul@marvell.com>
Date: Tue, 17 May 2016 00:27:17 +0300
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References: <D35F6F11.93C3E%paul@marvell.com> <297966AA-C7E0-4C3B-BA56-8D61D7824D66@vigilsec.com> <D35F843A.93C91%paul@marvell.com>
To: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
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Cc: IRTF CFRG <cfrg@irtf.org>, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] AES-SIV versus AES-GCM for Encrypted Key Data
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> On 17 May 2016, at 12:20 AM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>>> I would think that nonce/counter misuse protection would be an advantage for this type of application.  
>> 
>> I do not see how.  There is a fresh key-encryption key for each wrap.  Where can the counter be reused.
> 
> 
> Why would the NSA want to change an algorithm that apparently works (AES-SIV) with one that adds complexity in counter processing for this application?Yoav

The document says it’s because some parties require FIPS-approved algorithms, and AES-SIV is not a FIPS-approved algorithm. 

Interesting, but not binding on anyone who doesn’t require FIPS-approved algorithms.

Yoav

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