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Re: [Cfrg] AES-SIV versus AES-GCM for Encrypted Key Data

"Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu> Mon, 16 May 2016 21:02 UTC

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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] AES-SIV versus AES-GCM for Encrypted Key Data
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Date: Mon, 16 May 2016 21:02:02 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] AES-SIV versus AES-GCM for Encrypted Key Data
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> On May 16, 2016, at 3:35 PM, Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com> wrote:
>> I would think that nonce/counter misuse protection would be an advantage for
>> this type of application.
> I do not see how.  There is a fresh key-encryption key for each wrap.  Where
> can the counter be reused.

Are you saying that no two keys ever get encrypted with (wrapped by) the
same key-encryption key???

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