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Re: [Cfrg] AES-SIV versus AES-GCM for Encrypted Key Data

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Tue, 17 May 2016 13:51 UTC

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Tue, 17 May 2016 09:50:33 -0400
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To: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] AES-SIV versus AES-GCM for Encrypted Key Data
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>>> I would think that nonce/counter misuse protection would be an advantage for this type of application.  
>> 
>> I do not see how.  There is a fresh key-encryption key for each wrap.  Where can the counter be reused.
> 
> 
> Why would the NSA want to change an algorithm that apparently works (AES-SIV) with one that adds complexity in counter processing for this application?

I do not speak for NSA.  However, NSA only uses algorithms and modes that are FIPS-approved.  AES-SIV does not meet that requirement.  If that happens in the future, then the direction might change.

Russ

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