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Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security levels (ends on February 17th)

Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> Tue, 10 February 2015 21:05 UTC

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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Tue, 10 Feb 2015 23:05:01 +0200
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To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security levels (ends on February 17th)
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> On Feb 10, 2015, at 10:23 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 2:52 AM, Alexey Melnikov
> <alexey.melnikov@isode.com> wrote:
>> CFRG chairs are starting a poll, containing 2 initial questions:
>> 
>> Q1: Should CFRG recommend a curve at the 192-bit security level?
> 
> No
> 
>> 
>> Q2: Should CFRG recommend a curve at the 256-bit security level?
> 
> No
> 
> IMO CFRG should generate a curve with WF ~ 2^128 ASAP and should
> subsequently generate *one* good paranoid curve.  If that curve ends
> up having security level at or near 192 or 256 bits, then that's fine.

A paranoid curve would be nice, but I think that after ~2^128 is done, CFRG should start looking into specifying a genus-2 curve, like maybe the “kummer” in supercop.

The IETF groups are not clamoring for hyper-elliptic right now, which means that CFRG has enough time to do this slowly^H^H^H^H^H^H thoroughly, with no artificial deadlines.

Yoav

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