Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security levels (ends on February 17th)
Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com> Tue, 10 February 2015 18:05 UTC
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Date: Tue, 10 Feb 2015 13:05:46 -0500
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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security levels (ends on February 17th)
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On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 12:39 PM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie > wrote: > > > On 10/02/15 10:52, Alexey Melnikov wrote: > > CFRG chairs are starting a poll, containing 2 initial questions: > > > > Q1: Should CFRG recommend a curve at the 192-bit security level? > > Not interesting. > > > > > Q2: Should CFRG recommend a curve at the 256-bit security level? > > Yes, approximately. > > I would also be fine if there were compelling performance reasons > for one strength that is in between, e.g. 2^414-17 or similar, but > I would like only one strength level in addition to ~128-bit. > > I'm not that convinced that anything more than the 128-bit level > is needed, but I believe it will be demanded regardless so having > just one such specified is better than a zoo of higher strength > curves. > One of the reasons I really want a curve above 128 bit / Curve 25519 is precisely to clean up the zoo. And for that to happen there has to be a clear advantage of the new curve over ECC384 which is what we (and I suspect most other CAs who do ECC) support today. And by clear advantage I mean, can be explained over the phone in as short as time as possible. This has to be a complete no-brainer upgrade. It isn't just a matter of not being interested in the 192 bit curve, I want to phase out that strength. It is important that we have a back up algorithm that can be more or less relied on to provide a ten year cushion in the case that Curve 25519 is broken. But we don't need that cushion to be particularly efficient. On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 12:46 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net > wrote: > On Tue 2015-02-10 09:20:59 -0500, Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev wrote: > > Q1: No. > > Q2: Yes. > > > > For Q2: for Russia it is of primary importance that the curve is strictly > > 512-bit, not 521-bit. > > Can you elaborate on why this is of primary importance? If a 521-bit > curve is as performant, what would cause you to reject it? The performance advantages only exist for a 64 bit machine. Anyone building a dedicated crypto processor would probably choose either 256 bits or 512 bits for the internal bus size. The successor to DDR4 will almost certainly be a 512 bit I/O bus width. If you are working at the silicon level then 521 bits is a lot harder to manage than 512. Those extra 9 bits really do make a huge difference. Going from 256 bits to 255 is not a big deal. But going above 512 makes things really painful.
- [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security levels … Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Torsten Schütze
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Dan Brown
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Nguyen Dr., Kim
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Watson Ladd
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Aaron Zauner
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Christoph Anton Mitterer
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Dan Brown
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Paul Hoffman
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Adam Langley
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Yoav Nir
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Salz, Rich
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Tony Arcieri
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Mike Hamburg
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Yoav Nir
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Kurt Roeckx
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Alyssa Rowan
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Mike Hamburg
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Tony Arcieri
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Станислав Смышляев
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Andy Lutomirski
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… James Cloos
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Yoav Nir
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Damien Miller
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… James Cloos
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Mike Jones
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Benjamin Beurdouche
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… David Leon Gil
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Dan Harkins
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Olafur Gudmundsson
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Bindhunadhava
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Aaron Zauner
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Manger, James
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Russ Housley
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Russ Housley
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Brian Smith
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Paterson, Kenny
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Paterson, Kenny
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Yoav Nir
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Watson Ladd
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Dan Brown
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Annie Yousar
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Russ Housley
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Andrey Jivsov
- [Cfrg] Why I think 256-level is a bad idea [Was: … Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [Cfrg] Why I think 256-level is a bad idea [W… Adam Langley
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Michael Scott
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Simon Josefsson
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… _MiW
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Olafur Gudmundsson
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Brian Smith
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Paterson, Kenny
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Joseph Salowey
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Watson Ladd
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Kurt Roeckx
- Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security lev… Nex6|Bill