Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security levels (ends on February 17th)

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Tue, 10 February 2015 17:39 UTC

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Date: Tue, 10 Feb 2015 17:39:02 +0000
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Elliptic Curves - poll on security levels (ends on February 17th)
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On 10/02/15 10:52, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
> CFRG chairs are starting a poll, containing 2 initial questions:
> 
> Q1: Should CFRG recommend a curve at the 192-bit security level?

Not interesting.

> 
> Q2: Should CFRG recommend a curve at the 256-bit security level?

Yes, approximately.

I would also be fine if there were compelling performance reasons
for one strength that is in between, e.g. 2^414-17 or similar, but
I would like only one strength level in addition to ~128-bit.

I'm not that convinced that anything more than the 128-bit level
is needed, but I believe it will be demanded regardless so having
just one such specified is better than a zoo of higher strength
curves.

S.


> 
> Answering Yes/No to each of these would suffice.
> 
> Once this first set of issues is resolved, we will move to choices of prime
> at the selected security level(s), if any. After that we will be
> discussing implementation specifics and coordinate systems for
> Diffie-Hellman. We will then make decisions on signature schemes.
> Please don't discuss any of these future topics at this time.
> 
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