Re: [Cfrg] Security proofs v DH backdoors

Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com> Tue, 01 November 2016 01:14 UTC

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From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2016 18:13:51 -0700
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To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
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Cc: CFRG <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Security proofs v DH backdoors
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On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 5:50 PM, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
wrote:

> Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com> writes:
>
> >I don't know about "millions" (it's hard to say without stats on internal
> TLS
> >deployments which aren't visible from the Internet), but Logjam was pretty
> >pervasive, and also one of the forcing factors for the PCI council to
> mandate
> >TLS 1.1 at a minimum by 2018.
>
> Logjam wasn't really a DH weakness though, it was a "dear God, we're still
> using 512-bit keys in 2015?!?!?!?" weakness.


Rewinding back to my original point:

"FFDH has a massive legacy of insecure deployments. I do not think you can
say the same of ECDH."

-- 
Tony Arcieri