Re: [dane] PGP security models, was Summary of IETF LC for draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey

[manning <[e-mail]>]

Or, if your just going to nail this to email, its a whole lot easier to just insert this header..

xkcd.com/1181/

no real need to be fancy and do the actual PGP verification. Takes far to long.

manning
[e-mail]
PO Box 6151
Playa del Rey, CA 90296
310.322.8102






On 21September2015Monday, at 16:24, manning <[e-mail]> wrote:

> I think Paul nails it, at least for the more aware folks around.  Using the WoT to gauge anything other than confidence in choice of friends/associates is asking for trouble.
> See Also:  Robin Sage :  en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robin_Sage
> 
> manning
> [e-mail]
> PO Box 6151
> Playa del Rey, CA 90296
> 310.322.8102
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On 21September2015Monday, at 12:14, Paul Wouters <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
>> On Mon, 21 Sep 2015, John Levine wrote:
>> 
>>>> OPENPGP is a data format, WoT is one way to employ that format to
>>>> exchange messages.   It is not a *required* way to use OPENPGP.
>>> 
>>> Sure, but it's the way that everyone has used PGP for 20 years,
>>> and it's the security model that everyone I know expects when they
>>> use PGP keys.
>> 
>> Actually, nmost people I know never use the WoT. They only use keys
>> obtained directly from the person they want to exchange encrypted email
>> with.
>> 
>>> This draft uses a model in which the key is bound to a mailbox
>> 
>> openpgp keys are bound to ID's, which can ultimately end up in a
>> mailbox but is not required to do so.
>> 
>> For instance, the gpg key used to sign fedora21 packages with an openpgp
>> key ID containing "[e-mail]" might not have any mailbox
>> associated with it. It is merely shared in the DNS under an email address,
>> without a mailbox or valid local-part.
>> 
>>> any stronger identity, and you have to trust that the domain's
>>> management fairly represents its users
>> 
>> Correct, the domain's management that controls either DNS or SMTP servers,
>> can steal a users email.
>> 
>>> That's not a ridiculous model, but if
>>> that's the model, the draft and draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey-usage need
>>> to say so.  At this point, neither does.
>> 
>>> From the Introduction:
>> 
>>  This document specifies a method for publishing and
>>  locating OpenPGP public keys in DNS for a specific email address
>>  using a new OPENPGPKEY DNS Resource Record.  Security is provided via
>>  DNSSEC.
>> 
>> So your point is made already pretty clear in the introduction
>> already. Security comes from DNSSEC, so whoever controls the domain,
>> controls the publishing of openpgp keys.
>> 
>> Section 5.2 also contains some advise. Section 7.4 also mentions this,
>> but not under a section title that makes that very clear.
>> 
>> Some clarifications will be made, especially in the security
>> considerations section, to clarify this, based on the IETF LC comments.
>> 
>> Thank you,
>> 
>> Paul
>> 
>