Re: [dane] Summary of IETF LC for draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Fri, 18 September 2015 03:23 UTC

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From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2015 14:09:11 -0400
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Subject: Re: [dane] Summary of IETF LC for draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey
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> On Sep 17, 2015, at 5:26 AM, John C Klensin <john-ietf@jck.com> wrote:
> 
> The document seems to say that I should not trust a key found by
> this method just because of where I find it.  That is entirely
> consistent with other PGP documents and existing keyservers.  I
> should, instead, rely on web of trust relationships, e.g.,
> signatures on the particular key.

OPENPGP is a data format, WoT is one way to employ that format to
exchange messages.   It is not a *required* way to use OPENPGP.
In particular, if a user elects to configure an MUA to use DNSSEC
as a trusted introducer, so as to be able to increase privacy
of messaging beyond his immediate social circle, that's a fine
choice.  Think of it as "opportunistic PGP".  It's what you
do when you'd have otherwise sent the email in the clear anyway.

-- 
	Viktor.

Re: [dane] Summary of IETF LC for draft-ietf-dane… Viktor Dukhovni
Re: [dane] PGP security models, was Summary of IE… John Levine
Re: [dane] PGP security models, was Summary of IE… Paul Wouters
Re: [dane] PGP security models, was Summary of IE… manning
Re: [dane] PGP security models, was Summary of IE… manning
Re: [dane] PGP security models, was Summary of IE… Scott Kitterman
Re: [dane] PGP security models, was Summary of IE… John C Klensin
Re: [dane] PGP security models, was Summary of IE… Joe Abley
Re: [dane] PGP security models, was Summary of IE… Paul Wouters
Re: [dane] provisioning assumptions, was PGP secu… John Levine
Re: [dane] provisioning assumptions, was PGP secu… Paul Wouters
Re: [dane] PGP security models, was Summary of IE… Randy Bush
Re: [dane] PGP security models, was Summary of IE… Viktor Dukhovni
Re: [dane] PGP security models, was Summary of IE… Randy Bush
Re: [dane] PGP security models, was Summary of IE… Sam Hartman
Re: [dane] PGP security models, was Summary of IE… Dave Crocker
Re: [dane] PGP security models, was Summary of IE… Paul Wouters
Re: [dane] PGP security models, was Summary of IE… Sam Hartman
Re: [dane] PGP security models, was Summary of IE… Dave Crocker