Re: [dispatch] Identity Adhoc - Nov 9th: Notes available

Dean Willis <dean.willis@softarmor.com> Tue, 17 November 2009 21:09 UTC

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Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2009 15:08:49 -0600
From: Dean Willis <dean.willis@softarmor.com>
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Subject: Re: [dispatch] Identity Adhoc - Nov 9th: Notes available
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Dan Wing wrote:
>Jon said:
>>I do not find the requirement for NAT traversal unacceptable, 
>>but I do 
>>consider the requirement for media steering highly dubious at best.
> 
> 
> "Highly dubious" = nobody really does it?

People do highly dubious stuff all the time; they have unprotected sex, 
they jump out of perfectly good airplanes, they vote for Obama, they try 
for a single-handed Atlantic crossing in a 6 meter sailboat with no 
preparation, they try to implement RAI specifications from the RFC 
without parallel testing against existing systems, and so on.

The question is: Should we take the human urge to engage in highly 
dubious practies like traffic steering into account when we write an 
identity spec? If so, at what level of  dubiousness (or dubyaness, for 
the left-leaning) do we draw the line?

--
dean