Re: [dmarc-ietf] Ticket #39 - remove p=quarantine

Dotzero <dotzero@gmail.com> Wed, 02 December 2020 03:02 UTC

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From: Dotzero <dotzero@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 01 Dec 2020 22:01:53 -0500
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To: Steven M Jones <smj@crash.com>
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Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] Ticket #39 - remove p=quarantine
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On Tue, Dec 1, 2020 at 8:43 PM Steven M Jones <smj@crash.com> wrote:

> On 12/1/20 4:16 PM, Douglas Foster wrote:
> >
> > I have always assumed that p=quarantine and pct<>100 were included to
> > provide political cover for "Nervous Nellies" who were afraid to
> > enable p=reject.
>
> p=none, p=quarantine, and the pct= option were all included so that
> organizations could set policies according to their own risk/reward
> evaluation, including changes to those evaluations over time.
>

Absolutely agree with Steve on this. The key phrase is "risk/reward
evaluation". As about the first person to publish DMARC records (before the
specification was public), I went straight to p=reject, but I had the
benefit of feedback from participating mailbox providers before we even had
an agreed upon reporting format. Even with that, I missed one oddball
server for both DKIM signing and SPF. The organization I worked for had a
number of heavily abused domains from a direct domain abuse perspective.
None of the mail was going through mailing lists or other intermediaries
other than a very small fraction of a percent going through vanity domains,
etc. My point is that if my circumstances were different I might have gone
through p=quarantine or even stayed there permanently.

>
>
> > Pct<>100 is pretty much similar.   A sender can specify pct=20, but
> > that does not mean that I am going to allow spam into my system 80% of
> > the time simply to make the sender happy.
>
> I really hope no casual readers get the impression that DMARC bypasses
> spam filtering. DMARC evaluations are expected to be independent of spam
> evaluations. If there's any overlap here, perhaps it would be for DMARC
> (and/or underlying protocols) to provide reliable domain attribution to
> drive a local policy decision about filtering.
>

DMARC does one thing and one thing only - It mitigates direct domain abuse.
It does not stop spam, phishing or a multitude of other problems.

>
>
> > Leaving it deployed is a useful ruse to promote deployment.   I favor
> > leaving both mechanisms in place.
>
> While I deplore characterizing these policy elements as a "ruse," I
> agree that p=quarantine should be kept.
>

Again, I agree with Steve on this.

Michael Hammer