Re: [dns-privacy] Possible use case: Opportunistic encryption for recursive to authoritative

Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com> Sat, 08 August 2020 01:35 UTC

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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 07 Aug 2020 18:35:24 -0700
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To: Puneet Sood <puneets@google.com>
Cc: Puneet Sood <puneets=40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@icann.org>, "dprive@ietf.org" <dprive@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] Possible use case: Opportunistic encryption for recursive to authoritative
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On Fri, Aug 7, 2020 at 6:28 PM Puneet Sood <puneets@google.com> wrote:

> On Fri, Aug 7, 2020 at 9:22 PM Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Fri, Aug 7, 2020 at 6:18 PM Puneet Sood <puneets=
> 40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> >>
> >> I think this is worth doing.
> >
> >
> > I agree. The part that I worry about is the computational cost of
> reestablishing links after an outage. Is there a way to model this?
> (Perhaps this work has already been done)
>
> Outage of the authoritative or resolver? Can you explain your concern
> in more detail?
>

I meant an outage of the authoritative, or some substantial network link
connected to it.


> For a resolver an outage is similar to a cold start - the cost of
> connection setup will be amortized over all the queries done during
> the lifetime of the sessions.
>

I agree that the recursive resolver's reliability concerns don't change
much with encrypted DNS.

Assuming this traffic is encrypted, which I am in favor of, the CPU load on
the authoritative server will increase after an outage or network problem.

Is this already factored in?

thanks,
Rob