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Re: [DNSOP] Call for Adoption: draft-belyavskiy-rfc5933-bis

Dick Franks <rwfranks@acm.org> Wed, 17 June 2020 07:01 UTC

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From: Dick Franks <rwfranks@acm.org>
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2020 08:00:00 +0100
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To: dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>
Cc: Tim Wicinski <tjw.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Call for Adoption: draft-belyavskiy-rfc5933-bis
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Strength - equivalent to ECDSA p256, assuming no fundamental weakness in
the curve parameters.
The Net::DNS::SEC implementation of algorithm 12 verification involves an
algebraic transformation of ECC-GOST into a mathematically equivalent ECDSA
verification. Unless I am missing something, the same approach appears to
be feasible for GOST R34.10-2012 (256 bit).

Apart from a brief flowering in Verisign DNSSEC Analyser
<https://dnssec-debugger.verisignlabs.com/d1a12n1.rootcanary.net>,
algorithm 12 achieved almost no traction.
Implementers may have been discouraged by the mistake
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid3768> in R34.10-2001 test parameters.

But there is also a timeliness issue here.  A GOST R34.10 revision appears
every 11 years or so, and is deprecated 5 years after adoption of its
successor.  Next revision ETA 2023.

The sunset date specified in GOST R34.10-2012 having already passed,
algorithm 12 should be marked N in the DNSSEC Algorithm Numbers
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers> registry.


Dick Franks
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